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Abstract
The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) to solve cyber-
security problems has been gaining traction within industry and academia, in part as
a response to widespread malware attacks on critical systems, such as cloud infrastruc-
tures, government offices or hospitals, and the vast amounts of data they generate. AI-
and ML-assisted cybersecurity offers data-driven automation that could enable secu-
rity systems to identify and respond to cyber threats in real time. However, there is
currently a shortfall of professionals trained in AI and ML for cybersecurity. Here we
address the shortfall by developing lab-intensive modules that enable undergraduate
and graduate students to gain fundamental and advanced knowledge in applying AI and
ML techniques to real-world datasets to learn about Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI),
malware analysis, and classification, among other important topics in cybersecurity.
Here we describe six self-contained and adaptive modules in “AI-assisted Malware
Analysis.” Topics include: (1) CTI and malware attack stages, (2) malware knowledge
representation and CTI sharing, (3) malware data collection and feature identification,
(4) AI-assisted malware detection, (5) malware classification and attribution, and (6)
advanced malware research topics and case studies such as adversarial learning and
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) detection.
1 Introduction
The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) to solve cybersecurity
problems has been gaining more traction among industry and academia. This data driven
automation will enable security systems to identify and respond to cyber threats in real time.
The widespread malware attacks on critical issues including cloud infrastructures, govern-
ment offices or hospitals, together with vast amounts of data generated have necessitated the
need for formal education for AI and ML assisted cybersecurity education in universities. The
current shortfall of professionals who can use the AI and ML skills for cybersecurity demands
development and integration of such curriculum in the computer science and cybersecurity
programs.
All authors contributed equally to this work.
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The need for automation and adaptation has made AI one of the most sought-out skills
in the security industry [1]. In the year 2019, around 948 government agencies, educational
establishments and health-care providers got hit with a barrage of ransomware attacks at
a potential cost of $7.5 billion [2]. We can anticipate that such attacks on mission critical
infrastructure will continue to grow in coming years. AI embedded in analyst augmentation
systems will play a crucial role in cybersecurity. As mentioned in a recent report [3], 73% of
large to medium sized organizations are testing use-cases for AI in cybersecurity. Currently,
28% are using AI embedded security products, while 30% using proprietary AI algorithms.
42% currently use, or plan to use AI assisted cybersecurity products. The use of machine
and deep learning in cybersecurity is trending upwards, with almost two out of three (63%)
organizations planning to employ such products by the end of 2020. The use of AI and
Machine Learning (ML) for cybersecurity is one of the most in-demand cybersecurity skill [1].
Many universities have a wide variety of courses in AI and cybersecurity, there are still
very limited opportunities for students to apply AI in cybersecurity domain. Students need
to be educated about the use of AI and ML technologies in security systems so as to identify
and respond to threats in real time. Researchers have actively developed novel AI and ML
solutions for, Cyber Threat Intelligence [4–12], Malware Analysis [13–16], Malware Classifi-
cation [17], etc. to prevent and detect cyber-attacks.
Here we describe a course titled “AI assisted Malware Analysis” to transfer this research
to students. Providing students with the knowledge of using AI in malware analysis will
be an incredibly powerful tool to bridge the cybersecurity talent gap. It will open up the
opportunities for not only cybersecurity focused talent, but also from students across other
concentrations like data science or machine learning to apply their skills to solve cybersecurity
problems. On the other side, cybersecurity focused students who add AI to their skillset can
expect to open many more opportunities in this highly sought-after field.
In the course students are expected to gain fundamental and advanced knowledge in using
AI and ML techniques on real-world dataset for cyber threat intelligence, malware analysis,
classification among other important topics in the domain.
2 Course Overview & Pre-requisites
Here we present a summary of the curriculum that will be offered as part of the course:
“Artificial Intelligence assisted Malware Analysis”. This course will have 6 modules as shown
in Figure 1, including (1) Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) and malware attack stages (2)
Malware knowledge representation and CTI sharing (3) Malware data collection and feature
identification (4) AI assisted malware detection (5) Malware classification and attribution (6)
Advanced malware research topics and case studies. Here each module consists of lectures
and lab sessions. Figure 1, shows a strong bias towards experimentation/lab exercises.
Before enrolling in a course that teaches the proposed modules, students should have
completed the following pre-requisites concepts -
1. Introduction to Machine Learning/Artificial Intelligence - Students are supposed to
have taken an undergraduate introduction to machine learning/artificial intelligence,
generally taught to computer science majors at various universities. Students are ex-
pected to know key concepts and applications of machine learning/artificial intelligence.
Figure 1: Overview of Course Modules and Labs.
2. Introduction to Cybersecurity - The proposed course expect students to have basic
cybersecurity foundations, which are completed in 3 foundational knowledge units
(Cybersecurity Foundations, Cybersecurity Principles, IT Systems Components) as
discussed in the NSA/DHS CAE-CDE designation requirements [18].
3 Course Module Descriptions
3.1 Module 1: Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) and Malware At-
tack Stages
This module covers topics that describe various stages of a malware attack and how cor-
responding CTI is created for a particular attack. We first discuss how security analysts
describe and differentiate between various malware stages like, reconnaissance, initial com-
promise, command and control, lateral movement, exfiltration and corruption [19]. Next
the students understand how security researchers, to combat these malware based attacks,
retrieve malware samples from the ‘wild’. These samples are then ‘detonated’ in a controlled
environment and its behaviour ‘logged’. Using this behavioral data, security analysts map
various malware to known indicators and means of attacks. As a result of such studies, the
security analysts produce CTI. We also discuss various sources of CTI like, NIST’s National
Vulnerability Database (NVD) [20], Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [21],
After Action Reports [7], Social Media [4], Blogs and News Sources [22], Dark Web [8],
VirusTotal [23].
Students then are able to understand how CTI allows an organization to identify, assess,
monitor, and compute a response to cyber threats. CTI includes indicators of compromise;
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by threat actors; suggested actions to detect,
contain, or prevent attacks; recommended security tool configurations; threat intelligence
reports and the findings from the analyses of cyber incidents. Most organizations already
produce multiple types of cyber threat information about internal threats as part of their
security operations efforts. Students are made to understand that they can first identify
internally available intelligence and augment it by referring to trusted external CTI sources.
Furthermore, we also introduce an existing structured language for CTI, Structured
Threat Information eXpression (STIX) [24], developed under the OASIS framework [25].
This is followed by how it can be used for developing malware knowledge representations for
AI assisted malware detection techniques (See subsections 3.2 and 3.4).
• Lab 1a: Collecting CTI and identifying malware stages: In this lab, students
will create a program to collect CTI through various feeds like, NVD JSON 1.1 Vul-
nerability feed [26] and VirusTotal (Public API Endpoint limited to 4 requests per
minute) [23]. They will then be tasked to identify details about various malware stages
in the collected CTI samples. This lab can be done by students in any programming
language like python or Java.
• Lab 1b: Representing CTI in STIX: In this lab, participants will implement a
system that helps representing CTI in STIX. They will be given multiple CTI sam-
ples that need to be represented in STIX. Students will utilize publicly available STIX
project [27] python libraries to parse, manipulate, generate [28], and validate [29] STIX
content. The lab will teach students to correctly assign intelligence indicators of com-
promise; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), etc. to the correct corresponding
STIX schema bindings [30].
3.2 Module 2: Malware Knowledge Representation and CTI Shar-
ing
Knowledge representation is a field of AI that focuses on designing efficient computer rep-
resentations that capture information vital for complex problems. In order to create AI
assisted malware detection systems, students need to understand various malware repre-
sentation techniques. In this module, we focus on popular techniques that enable security
analysts to store malware data and representations in databases, knowledge graphs, and
vector spaces.
We begin this module by introducing students to a typical malware database schema,
based on the STIX schema [30]. We provide students this malware behavioural feature
dataset that includes CPU usage, memory usage, disk I/O, network usage, etc. We have
access to such a dataset collected as a part of a research project [13]. This also helps us
explain to students various malware data collection schemes discussed later in Module 3
(subsection 3.3).
Students then learn about various AI specific malware representations, which include
malware knowledge graphs, ontologies, and vector spaces. These representation techniques
have been used extensively to represent behavioral information and CTI, and enable students
to understand different knowledge representation techniques for malware from a variety of
perspectives [?, 4, 9, 11, 31–36]. We also highlight various advantages and disadvantages
associated with the use these representation techniques, for example, the use of ontology
reasoning mechanisms that are processed over a knowledge graph, experiments have shown
that this method has high malicious code detection rate and low false alarm rate [7, 33].
We discuss the benefits of cyber threat information sharing [37]. The modules will cover
Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information (TAXII) [38]. TAXII is an ex-
change framework that allows various organizations to share CTI using the STIX format (See
Section 3.1). It enables distribution of CTI among cyber information sharing and analysis
organizations. Students are introduced to various CTI sharing models that present disparate
use-cases depending on organization policy, like, Hub and Spoke model, Source/Subscriber
model, Peer To Peer model [38].
• Lab 2a: Querying malware knowledge representations: Students will be given
access to servers hosting various malware representations like databases, knowledge
graphs, and vector models. Students will run specific queries, find similarities and
dis-similarities between various malware representations.
• Lab 2b: TAXII servers: In this exercise, students will connect to open source TAXII
servers [39, 40] and download posted Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI). Students will
also configure a TAXII server themselves [41] and post available STIX CTI to their
TAXII servers [42].
3.3 Module 3: Malware Data Collection, Feature Identification
and Preprocessing
In this module, students learn three steps of malware data collection and feature identifica-
tion: samples gathering, features identification, and data collection. In samples gathering, we
discuss ways of acquiring malware samples including honeypots (active and passive) and mal-
ware public databases (e.g., VirusTotal [23] and VirusShare [43]). In features identification,
we discuss commonly used static features like binary n-grams, Control Flow Graphs (CFGs)
and static API calls, along with behavioral features like performance metrics, memory infor-
mation, and system calls. In data collection, we discuss the usage of isolated environments
such as sandboxes (e.g., Cuckoo Sandbox) and virtual machines. We will also discuss the
limitations of using isolated environments and other alternatives including the use of a live
testbed for real world use cases simulation. Further, we discuss host-based and network-
based collecting agents as well as virtual machine introspection. The collected dataset with
also be used to populate a malware database schema as discussed in Module 2 (subsection
3.2).
The collected data features which are of different scales and categories, require prepro-
cessing. We teach feature normalization and standardization techniques including discussion
on categorical data and ways to convert it into numerical data. For features which are in huge
numbers, we discuss dimensionality reduction techniques, specifically Principle Component
Analysis (PCA) and Independent Component Analysis (ICA).
• Lab 3a: Malware Samples Collection: In this lab, students will utilize a public
malware database service to acquire working ransomware samples for linux platform.
They will be provided an isolated VM where they can ensure that collected samples
are working properly.
• Lab 3b: Malware Data Collection/Collecting Agents: In the second part, stu-
dents will write a host-based collecting agent to capture malware behavioral data. This
lab will focus on capturing malware system calls. Students will be provided with an
isolated VM where they can utilize the samples acquired in Lab 3a to run, test and
collect the data using their agent.
Features Extraction
Machine Learning Based Malware Detection
File ClassificationOnline Malware Detection
Static AnalysisDynamic Analysis
Binary N-grams Control Flow Graphs (CFG) Static API callsSystem callsMemory features
Performance 
metrics
Figure 2: Overview of AI Assisted Malware Detection
3.4 Module 4: AI assisted Malware Detection
In this module students learn various AI/ML based malware detection techniques and cor-
responding extracted features as shown in Figure 2. Malware detection techniques can be
divided into two categories: online malware detection and file classification. Some of the
techniques we discuss in this module include classical algorithms like, support vector ma-
chines [16], DBSCAN [44], etc. and state-of-the-art deep neural networks [13].
We start with file classification techniques including static and dynamic analysis. In static
analysis, students learn three major classes of features including: Binary N-grams [45–48],
Control Flow Graphs (CFGs) [49–51] and Static features/Disassembling [52, 53]. Although
static analysis techniques are efficient, most recent malware are sophisticated and has poly-
morphic nature, which hinder the effectiveness of static analysis. To overcome this, students
are also taught AI/ML based dynamic analysis techniques, which focus on behavioural as-
pects of malware. To that end, we discuss various tools needed to monitor system processes,
filesystem and registry changes and network activity. We provide a use case that focuses
on running executables in a controlled environment and observing their behavior, where
system/API calls [17,54–57] are mainly used.
File classification approaches can be considered prevention mechanisms, since only exe-
cutables deemed as benign can be run on the system leaving no chance for malicious executa-
bles to run free. However, they can not help detecting malware in an already checked benign
application that got infected later on. Henceforth, we will develop modules for online de-
tection approaches, which will help understand and develop ability to continuously monitor
the entire system for the presence of malicious activities. We will include different features
used in this approach which are more dynamic and time dependent such as performance
metrics [13, 58–60], memory features [61,62] or run-time system/API calls [63–65].
Lab 4: Malware Detection: In this lab, students will be tasked to use the previ-
ously collected data in Lab 3b (subsection 3.3) and select one AI/ML algorithm to apply
on this dataset. They will apply data pre-processing step as necessary depending on the
chosen AI/ML algorithm. Students will be provided with a GPU-enabled machines to help
speeding up the AI/ML model training. Additionally, students will report their findings
with rationalization of their choices, supporting graphs and proper explanation.
3.5 Module 5: AI assisted Malware Classification
Malware is used for many purposes such as: stealing data, asking for ransoms, creating
backdoors, tracking user activity, and spreading spam, to say the least. Because of the
ubiquitous nature of malware, it is important not only to detect the presence of malware but
also the type (e.g., worm, trojan, backdoor, rootkit, ransomware, etc.) and the function of
that malware. This can help in faster remedy actions. As such, students learn the different
malware types and how to apply different machine learning algorithms to classify malware
into known families.
Classification is not an easy task, since it is not as simple as placing a malware in an
unambiguous class. In most cases, real-world malware has a wide variety of nefarious ca-
pabilities and propagation mechanisms. This makes classification harder and unpredictable.
Even when families of malware share similarities, minor modifications in a malware can cause
confusion to the classifier. Malware classification goes beyond simply classifying the mal-
ware based on its name. In this module, different methods are discussed including classic
classification, deep learning and clustering based approaches. Students also learn how to
choose the right classification scheme depending on specific use cases. This can be achieved
using NIST’s [66] outlined steps an organization can take to develop a malware classification
scheme to prioritize specific incidents.
Lab 5: Malware Classification: In this lab, students train a model to classify
malware into 9 families based on the Kaggle dataset [67,68]. They will be required to employ
AI/ML algorithms and a subset of features extracted from the dataset which they believe
will increase the accuracy of the classifier, providing their technical reasoning behind such
choices. Additionally, students will be given a VM with a fixed defined specification to run
their experiments, which will limit their choices of the AI/ML algorithm architecture as well
as the number of features to use, given the lab deadline. Students will utilize python scikit-
learn [69], PyTorch [70] and/or Tensorflow [71] framework for developing AI/ML algorithms.
3.6 Module 6: Advance Malware Research Topics and Case Stud-
ies
In this module, advance and evolving topics related to AI assisted cybersecurity are discussed.
First, students learn about adversarial machine learning attacks, where models can be fooled
through malicious input. We discuss how adversaries can poison the model to make wrong
classifications, different kinds of adversarial ML attacks, including the black box and white
box attacks. Data Poisoning and evasion techniques are also discussed. Defense strategies to
combat adversarial ML attacks will be covered. These include primarily two types of defense
strategies: 1) reactive: detect adversarial examples after deep neural networks are built;
2) proactive: make deep neural networks more robust before adversaries generate adver-
sarial examples. We discuss three reactive countermeasures (Adversarial Detecting, Input
Reconstruction, and Network Verification) and three proactive countermeasures (Network
Distillation, Adversarial (Re)training, and Classifier Robustifying).
Another important topic to be discussed is Advance Persistent Threats (APTs). We
discuss APT progression including the network infiltration, expansion and extraction. With
around 73% of the organizations rate their detection capability as inadequate, it is impor-
tant to focus on detection techniques. We discuss AI based APT detection and analysis
techniques. Fuzzing has been used traditionally to find software bugs by randomly feeding
data into a target program until one permutation reveals a vulnerability. Applying AI and
ML models to fuzzing enables it to become more efficient and effective. We discuss such
techniques and relevant tools.
In this module, students are also introduced to case studies discussing recent malware
attacks and applications of AI for malware analysis. This includes case studies about recent
ransomware attacks against cities and critical establishments across the U.S. It highlights
how such attacks were orchestrated and how AI/ML assisted detection mechanisms discussed
in the earlier modules can be used to restrict their effects.
• Lab 6a: Adversarial Examples: In this lab, students are tasked with generating
adversarial examples that bypass the detection techniques they built in the previous
labs (3.3 and 3.4) by utilizing cleaverhans [72] library. This will help them in learning
how such examples are crafted and used in practice.
• Lab 6b: Adversarial Training: In this lab, students are expected to apply ad-
versarial training, one of the easiest and most effective approaches to defend against
adversarial attacks. Adversarial training is an approach where a model is retrained
using adversarial examples so that the model will not be fooled by such examples.
4 Conclusion
In this article, we provide an outline of a cybersecurity course, which will discuss state of the
art skill sets with respect to the use of AI and ML for malware analysis. We firmly believe
that such a course when introduced at various universities and educational institutions will
produce graduates and future workforce who will be well versed and equipped to prevent,
detect and mitigate against sophisticated cyberattacks.
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